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Abstract
Quantum measurement theory has fallen under the resticting influence of the
attempt to explain the fundamental axioms of quantum theory in terms of the
theory itself. This has not only led to confusion but has also restricted our
attention to a limited class of measurements. This paper outlines some of the
novel types of measurements which fall outside the usual textbook description.
The problem of quantum measurement has been with us since the foundations of the the
theory were laid in the mid 1920’s. It has generated much discussion, with little resolution
of the questions raised. I will argue in this talk that this situation has arisen in part because
of the confusion brought about by giving two very different concepts the same name, with
the expected result that the valid questions related to the two concepts become entangled.
It furthermore has led to a restriction on the types of measurements considered within the
theory. In this talk I am not going to propose any radical or even very new interpretations
of the theory of quantum mechanics. I am rather going to engage in an ancient philosophical
past–time, name to propose that we use distinct terms for distinct concepts. I am then going
to review some of the novel insights which have been obtained recently ( especially by the
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group around Aharonov) regarding some novel types of measurement.
I. MEASUREMENT, DETERMINATION AND KNOWLEDGE
The concept of measurement in quantum mechanics has had a long and confused history.
There are essentially two separate concepts which have been conflated under the same title,
concepts with a very different status in the theory a priori. In part the intense confusion
surrounding the word results from the attempt to reconcile these two different concepts, or
rather to apply the properties of the one concept to the other.
The first concept subsumed under the term measurement is an axiomatic concept. Quan-
tum mechanics, as with all of our theories in physics, is based on a set of mathematical
structures. In the case of quantum mechanics, these structures are those of complex Hilbert
spaces, and operators on those Hilbert spaces. In addition to such mathematical struc-
tures, the theory must also make contact with the physical world. Structures in the theory
must be correlated by structures in our experience of the world itself. As with all theories,
quantum mechanics is a means of answering questions about our experiences of the world.
Furthermore they are questions which are related to the particulars and peculiarities of the
actual world we live in. The theory requires a mapping the mathematical structure onto our
experiences. As in all physical theories this takes the form both of a general map, of general
structures of the world which we expect to have a broad range of validity, and structures
which reflect the particulars and peculiarities of our experiences.
In classical physics, the former is called the dynamical theory, while the latter is called
the initial conditions. The theory encompasses the identification of dynamic variables and
equations of motion, while the ”initial conditions” encompass those aspects of our experience
which are felt to be peculiar to the individual time and place of those experiences.
Quantum mechanics contains both of these aspects as well, but in a very different form
from that of classical physics. The dynamics is represented by the operators, while, in
the simplest case, the particulars of the situation is represented by the vector in the Hilbert
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space, the wave function. I will denote these particulars by the term knowledge or conditions,
rather than the term ”initial conditions”, since as we will see, conditions need not be initial,
nor are they in general equivalent to initial conditions (as they are in classical physics).
In addition to explanations, the theory must produce answers, must give us the answers
to questions that we may have about the physical situations that we are interested in. It is
here that the theory actually makes contact with the physical world. In quantum mechanics
these answers are in terms of probabilities. The usual phrasology goes something like ”
When one measures a quantity, and the system is in the state |φ >, the outcome of that
measurement is one of the eigenvalues, say a, of the operator, sayA, representing the physical
variable measured, and the probability is given by the usual expression | < a|φ > |.”
However, the word ”measure” brings with it the image of a physical process. Measure-
ments are performed by means of measuring apparatuses. As aspects of the physical world,
such measuring apparatuses should themselves be describable by quantum mechanics itself.
But it is difficult to have a system in which at the same time a concept is an axiomatic
feature of the theory, and one describable by the theory. I would therefore suggest that the
word ”determine” be used instead for this axiomatic feature of the theory. Thus I would
rephrase the above sentence as “ When one determines a quantity, and the knowledge ( or
conditions) under which one wishes to determine that quantity are represented by the vector
|φ >, then the determination of a quantity represented by A gives one of eigenvalues of A,
say a with probability | < a|φ > |2.”
Determination, in this axiomatic sense, says nothing about how the determination was
made. It is simply a statement of a mapping from the theory to our experience, in which
some knowledge sets the conditions on the questions we wish to ask, and some knowledge
represents the answers to the questions we want to ask.
What then is a measurement? I will reserve the term measurement for a physical process,
a process which is describable in terms of quantum theory itself. A measurement is a
process in which one has two separate physical systems, represented by two separate sets
of dynamical operators. Furthermore the dynamical evolution is such that, given certain
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conditions on the measuring apparatus, a determination of some quantity associated with
the measuring apparatus will give information about the system of interest.
Von Neumann [1] showed that under certain conditions, a measurement on a system
could be treated as a determination of that system. I.e., certain types of measurement ( in
which one makes a determination of some aspect of the measuring apparatus only) acted
in all ways as though one had instead made a determination of the system itself. There is
a consistency in quantum mechanics, such that the axiomatic concept I call determination,
is closely related to the physical process I call measurement. However, notice that in von
Neumann’s analysis, one has not done away with the concept of determination. One still
must apply the axiomatic concept of determination to the measuring apparatus before one
can draw any conclusions at all from the theory. It is just that such measurements allow us
to reduce a complicated system ( apparatus plus system of interest) to a simple system ( the
system of interest alone) under certain conditions. This mapping of a complex system onto
a simpler system does not however in any way change the requirement for the axiomatic
concept of “determination”. It simply changes the system to which we need to apply the
concept.
At least in part the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the disquiet that
physicists feel for the concept of “determination”. It feels like an extra and extraneous
concept, a non-physical concept. In classical physics, one can imagine that the theory and
reality are in complete correspondence. The position of a particle really is a number, and
our experience of that position is simply the experience of that number. The physical map
from experience to theory is just an identification of those numbers in the theory with the
experience. (That some fairly sophisticated manipulations of experience are necessary to
extract that number is a technical detail.) In quantum mechanics on the other hand, there
seems to be no direct map from our experience to the theory. The operators themselves
have far too much structure for experience. The state, or Hilbert space vector itself, has
the wrong properties to map onto our experience. The only map is the rather indirect and
seemingly unnatural one of “determination”. One would like either to subsume determi-
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nation under some physical concept of the theory ( but that would loose the only relation
between experience and the theory that the theory contains) or to introduce some other
relation between the theory and experience from which one could derive ‘determination’ in
a natural way. That neither of these objectives has ever been achieved is a large part of the
‘problem of measurement’ in quantum mechanics.
However, I do not want to spend any more of my time on this issue. Rather I want
to point out the the concern about this problem has warped our thinking about quantum
mechanics and about the types of measurement possible in the theory. Because the von-
Neumann type of measurement creates the possibility of reduction of a complex system to a
simpler system, the idea has become implanted that all measurement must be of the same
sort. Because determination has a certain form, measurement must have the same form
seems to be the thinking. However it is becoming clear, especially through the work of the
group around Aharonov, that this is too restrictive.
Measurement is a physical process by which one has two system interacting, and by
making a determination on the one system, one can obtain information about the other sys-
tem. In certain cases, the information obtained is the same as a determination, but in other
cases it can differ significantly. Furthermore, because of the similarity of wave mechanics to
classical wave theory, the impression has also arisen that conditions in quantum mechanics
are entirely equivalent to conditions in classical mechanics, namely initial conditions. Let
me look at the last case first.
It has long been known to some ( but ignored or resisted by most) that the conditions in
quantum mechanics differ significantly from those of classical physics [2]. In classical physics,
all conditions can, by use of the equation of motion, be mapped onto initial conditions.
Whether one measures the position now and the momentum two days hence, or measures
them both now is really irrelevant. For any condition, imposed at time, one can always, by
use of the equations of motion, produce initial conditions which are entirely equivalent in
all of their predictions to those general conditions. However, as Aharonov, Bergmann, and
Liebowitz [2] already showed about 30 years ago ( and as has been independently rediscovered
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often since—e.g., [5]) setting conditions at different times may not be equivalent to any initial
conditions. The simplest example is that of a spin 1/2 particle whose x component of spin
is known at 9AM and y component at 11 AM. Say both are known to have value +1/2. The
probability that if one determines the component cos(θ)Sx + sin(θ)Sy at 10AM, the answer
will be +1/2 is
PSθ=1/2 =
(1 + cos(θ)(1 + sin(θ)
2(1 + sin(θ) cos(θ))
. (1)
Note there exist no initial condition— wave function or density matrix— which would give
this answer. It is unity for both θ = 0 and for θ = π/2. The conclusion drawn from this
simple example is true in general- conditions in quantum mechanics are not equivalent to
initial conditions.
Already at the last NY Academy of Sciences meeting in 1986, Aharonov [6] mentioned
a surprising new effect which combines the inequivalence of conditions to initial conditions
together with what he calls ”weak’ measurements. If we set both initial and final conditions,
and at the intermediate time perform a particular type of inexact measurement of a quantity,
the outcome of that measurement can be very counter intuitive. Although the measuring
apparatus and the interaction are designed so that if the initial state is an eigen state
of the measured quantity, the outcome will be approximately given by that value for the
measured quantity, in this pre and post conditioned experiment, the expected value for the
measurement is impossible according to all the usual tenants of quantum mechanics.
Let me make this clear by an example. Our measuring apparatus is a trivial infinite
mass free particle. it is coupled to a spin s particle ( in my example s = 20). The coupling
is of the form
HI =
ǫ√
(2)
(Sx + Sy)pδ(t− t0) (2)
Ie, the interaction is such that if the initial state of the free particle is ψ(x), and the state of
the spin is in an eigenstate of the operator S// say with eigenvalue σ, then the final state of
the free particle is ψ(x − ǫσ). Thus by measuring the displacement of the the free particle
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due to the interaction one can estimate σ and thus measure S//. If the particle begins in
an eigenstate ( or almost and eigenstate) of X (ie ψ is sharply peaked about some value x0
with an uncertainty much less than ǫ) then the displacement during the interaction can be
measured precisely by determining the value x of X after the interaction, and σ = (x−x0)/ǫ
will be a measurement of S. On the other hand, if the initial ψ has a spread of ∆x, then
the final determination of X will give the displacement only to ±∆x. Ie, we will have
σ = (x− x0)/ǫ±∆x/ǫ. This is the sense in which the measuring apparatus is inexact. The
determination of some variable of the measuring apparatus only gives an inexact estimate
of the value of some dynamic variable of the system.
Now consider the following situation. Set conditions such that before the interaction
with the measuring apparatus, the value of Sx is known to be its maximum possible value,
s. Furthermore after the interaction, the value of the y component, Sy, is known to be the
maximum possible value, s. What is the distribution of possible outcomes for the measuring
apparatus? One would expect this to be something like the some probability distribution
over the various possible values for S// convoluted with the initial probability distribution
for the position of the free particle. Ie, one would expect something like
∑
σ Pσ|ψ(x− ǫσ)|2
where Pσ is a probability for the spin to have value −s ≤ σ ≤ s. In particular, the average
value ( expectation value) for X should lie somewhere between x0 − ǫs and x0 + ǫs. If
the measurement is sufficiently accurate this expectation is fulfilled. Figure 1 plots the
probability distribution for the location of the particle ( x0 = 0 and ǫ = 1) in the case where
the initial spread of the wave function for the particle is small. However, Figure 2 is the plot
of the distribution for the value of the position of the particle in the case where the initial
spread for X is large (of order ±ǫ
√
(s)). Note that the center of the probability distribution
is at x ≈ 28, and the probability that x would lie between -20 and 20, the naively expected
values, is very small. Using the determined value of X to infer the value of S// gives a value
at all times larger than the maximum eigenvalue of S//.
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Figure 1
The probability distribution for the pointer of the measuring apparatus with pre and post
conditions with a small error (≈ .5) for the measurement of the spin. The maximum value
of the spin is 20.
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Figure 2
The probablility distribution for the pointer with the same conditions as in figure 1 but with
a large error (5) for the infered value of the spin. Note that the distribution centers around
the value of 28 and has only a very small probability of lying between 20 and -20.
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Note that if we regard S as a classical vector spin, and we know that Sx and Sy both
have value s, then S// will have value
√
S2x + S
2
y =
√
2s ≈ 28. Note also that this works in
this way only if the initial state ψ(x) is sufficiently smooth. (In my case I have chosen it to
be a gaussian). In particular, sharp features in ψ will destroy this property.
One reaction to this example is that it is not a real measurement. However, it meets all
of the criteria of a measuring apparatus, in that if the state of the spin is an eigenstate, the
measuring apparatus produces the value to the accuracy to which the apparatus is designed.
What we have here is a strange result which arises from the combination of an inexact
measuring apparatus, combined with the inequivalence of conditions in quantum mechanics
to be equivalent to initial conditions. (For any initial conditions, the expectations that the
result would simply have been the sum of the probabilities of the result for the eigenstates
would have been true.) Note that this is a measurement situation in which the measurement
is not equivalent to any determination on the spin system itself.
There is another measurement situation which leads to results in conflict with the von
Neumann equivalence of measurements and determination. This is a situation I call adiabatic
measurement. It arises out another situation noted by the group around Aharonov [3]. (They
call it ‘protected’ measurements, a term I feel to be highly misleading. They furthermore
use it to argue that the wave function is ‘real’ in some sense, a conclusion I also have great
difficulty with [4].) This is a situation in which the measuring apparatus is coupled to
the system sufficiently weakly, and the system’s evolution during the interaction with the
measuring apparatus is dominated by a Hamiltonian with sufficiently widely spaced energy
levels that the interaction with the apparatus can be treated throughout as an adiabatic
perturbation.
Consider a system whose Hamiltonian during the course of the interaction is given by
H0. Consider couplings to a set of measuring apparatuses ( which for simplicity we will take
as free infinitely massive particles again, although nothing changes if we use more complex
measuring apparatuses).
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H = H0 +
∑
i
ǫi(t)AiPi (3)
where the Ai are a variety of operators associated with the system (in general non-
commuting) and the pi are the momenta of a set of free infinitely massive particles. We
can solve this assuming that the measuring apparatus are in the momentum eigenstates
|pi >, to obtain the adiabatic approximation to the Schroedinger equation for the system
|ψ(t) >= ∑
E
aE(t)|E > (4)
ia˙E = E(t)aE(t)− i
∑
E′
aE′ < E(t)| ˙|E ′(t) > ≈ E(t)aE (5)
where
E(t) ≈ E0 +
∑
i
ǫ(t) < E0|Ai|E0 > pi (6)
where |E0 > are the eigenstates of H0 and E0 their eigenvalue. Thus the equation of motion
for the state of the system plus measuring apparatus can be written as
|Ψ(t) >= ∑
E
aE(0)e
i
∫
t
(E0+
∑
i
ǫ(t)<E0|Ai|E0>Pidt)|E(t) > ∏
i
|φi > (7)
=
∑
E
eiE0t|E(t) > ∏
i
ei
∫
ǫ(t)dt<E0|Ai|E0>Piφi(xi) (8)
=
∑
E
eiE0t|E(t) > ∏
i
φi(xi −
∫
ǫi(t)dt < E0|Ai|E0 >) (9)
After the interaction with the apparatus is finished, the state is
|Ψ(t) >= ∑
E0
aE(0)e
iE0t|E0 >
∏
i
|φ(xi −
∫
ǫidt < E0|Ai|E0 >) > (10)
Each of the measuring apparatuses has been displaced by an amount
∫
ǫi(t)dt < E0|Ai|E0 >,
ie by an amount proportional to the expectation value of the measured operator Ai in the
state |E0 >. Now, if we assume that the states φ(xi) are sufficiently narrow that there is
at least one Ai such that
∫
ǫi(t)dt(< E0|Ai|E0 > − < E ′0|Ai|E ′0 > is larger than the initial
uncertainty in φi(x), then the various energy eigenvalues will decohere. The measuring
apparatuses will point to a value < E0|Ai|E0 >, ie an expectation value, for some value of
E0, with the probability of that E0 given by |ai(0)|2 = | < E0|ψ > |2.
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There are a number of strange features of this result. In the first place, the value to
which the measuring apparatus points is not that corresponding to one of the eigenvalues
of Ai. The measuring apparatus measures Ai, but the pointer does not give one of Ai’s
eigenvalues but rather gives an expectation value, < E0|Ai|E0 > in any single measurement.
Furthermore if we repeat the experiment, we will, as expected get a variety of answers that
the pointer points to , namely each of the various expectation values for the various possible
values of E0. Over a large number of trials, we expect to get a number of trials in which we
get a specific value < E0|Ai|E0 > a number of times given by N | < E0|ψ > |2 times. Thus
the statistical expectation value for the measurements of Ai are
< Ai >stat=
∑
E0
| < psi|E0 >< E0|Ai|E0 >< E0|ψ > (11)
But the quantum mechanical expectation value of Ai is given by
< Ai >QM
∑
E0
∑
E′
0
| < psi|E0 >< E0|Ai|E ′0 >< E ′0|ψ > (12)
In general, only if the vectors E0 are also eigenvectors of Ai are these two expressions the
same. I.e., the statistical expectation value of Ai obtained by performing a large number
of such adiabatic measurements is not the quantum expectation of Ai in the state of the
system.
We thus have a situation which violates almost all of the standard lore about mea-
surements. Since the Ai are not necessarily commuting ( there is nothing in the above
derivation which demands that they commute), we can, in a single measurement measure
non-commuting variables. Furthermore, if the initial state is an eigenstate of H0, then ev-
ery measurement in and ensemble of measurements will give exactly the same value for
the measurement of those non-commuting variables. there will be no statistical uncertainty
in the result. Furthermore, the outcome of the measurement is not an eigenvalue of the
operator corresponding to the measured quantity Ai. It is rather an expectation value of
that quantity. The statistical distribution of the results does not depend on the quantities
Ai being measured. Rather, the statistical distribution depends on the eigenvectors of the
Hamiltonian H0 which is not coupled to any measuring apparatus at all.
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It is interesting to note that the standard von Neumann measurement falls into exactly
this class as well. In the von Neumann measurement, the interaction with the measuring
apparatus is such that the coupling to the apparatus dominates the dynamics during the
measurement. eg, the hamiltonian is of the form
H = Hfree + ǫδ(t)AP (13)
In this case, the dominant hamiltonian during the interaction is A, since δ(0) is infinite. The
coupling to the measuring apparatus A clearly commutes with the dominant Hamiltonian
A and thus the interaction is adiabatic for an arbitrary time dependence of ǫ(t) = ǫδ(t).
According to our adiabatic analysis, the measurement will give us various expectation values
< E0|A|E0 > where the E0 are the eigenvalues of the dominant hamiltonian A. I.e., the
E0 are just the eigenvalues a of A. Thus the measured quantities will be < a|A|a >= a
the eigenvalues of A. The probability of obtaining the value of a in the measurement is
| < E0|ψ > |2 = | < a|ψ > |2, and the statistical expectation value of A is
< A >stat= | < ψ|a > |2a =< A >QM (14)
We thus see that the usual rules on measurement are simply a special case of the results
obtained for adiabatic measurements.
Note however that the general adiabatic measurement is not equivalent to a determi-
nation. This however does not make them any the less interesting as measurements. In
fact the archetypal quantum measurement example, the Stern Gerlach experiment, used
in almost all the text books as an example of the von Neumann measurement is actually
an adiabatic measurement, in which non-commuting observables, the spin in both of the
transverse directions is adiabatically measured. For details see reference [4].
II. CONCLUSIONS
The key points of this talk have been
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1) in the standard formulation of quantum mechanics the term measurement is used to
denote two distinct concepts. In order to clarify the problems, I have suggested that it would
be useful to use separate terms to denote separate concepts, and have proposed that we use
‘determination’ for the axiomatic concept and reserve measurement for the physical notion
of using changes induced into one system to deduce properties of another system.
2) I have pointed out the old but little understood feature of quantum mechanics that
the conditions in quantum mechanics are not equivalent to initial conditions. A couple
of examples have emphasized this unexpected nature of the results obtained in quantum
mechanics when conditions span the the time during which one wants to ask questions of
the quantum system.
3) I have shown that if we liberate the notion of measurement from determination, the
variety of measurements are in fact much larger than simply those which are equivalent to
a determination. although this has been well known for a long time in the case of inexact
measurements, the example of adiabatic measurements show that many of the features of
measurements of the von Neumann type are features restricted to that type of measurement
alone.
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